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THE federal budget and the economy interact at many points, with
the level of economic activity determining receipts and certain ex-
penditures and being influenced in turn by tax rates and government
outlays. This paper attempts to specify some of these interrelation-
ships in the hope of increasing, if only slightly, the precision with
which the government sector can be handled in long-term and short-
term economic models.
The usual practice is to place a substantial portion of the federal
sector in a box called "exogenous." This is as it should be. However
much the economic scientist feigns a disinterest in mundane reality,
there is usually at the root of his inquiries at least an indirect interest
in normative public economic policy. So even if the political scientists
offered models in which government behavior was completely deter-
minate, I submit that the economist would decline them. And, of
course, there have been few offers of this sort. More than one model-
builder has been mildly shocked to find that the government itself
does not always know how much it is going to spend within a fairly
wide margin of error only a short period ahead.
Having stated the impossibility as well as the undesirability of
specifying public sector behavior, I now attempt to make this sector
perhaps a little more manageable for the model-builder. In some
cases, reasonable quantitative estimates of parameters are possible.
In others, identifying if not measuring the parameters may suggest
rough limits on the range of permissible values. Finally, certain
problem areas are mentioned, where I think further research would
pay dividends in pinning down important interrelationships between
the federal sector and the rest of the economy.
NoTE: The author was on the staff of the United States Bureau ofBudget when
this paper was prepared. However, there is obviously no expressed or implied official
endorsement of any of its contents. He is indebted for the perceptive comments of
Samuel M. Cohn and Edward F. Denison.
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Long-Range Projections for the Federal Sector
FEDERAL REVENUES UNDER CONDITIONS OF STABLE GROWTH
AND CONSTANT RATES
A long-run projection of revenues for the federal government con-
veniently starts from a calculation of yields under existing rates for
most taxes, modified in the case of social security payroll taxes,
where rate increases are built in under existing law. Subsequently,
the effects of additional rate changes can be fed in according to the
policy assumptions made or in conjunction with a projection of
expenditures.
A yield calculation based on existing rates may appear, on the
surface, a rather mechanical exercise, but in practice there is some
margin for error. This is particularly the case when both the tax
revenues and tax base one is trying to relate are on a national income
account basis—presumably the usual situation in economic model-
building. Both the base and the tax in national income terms differ
conceptually from their counterparts in the tax code. The corpora-
tion income tax is an outstanding example.
Corporation Income Tax
On the assumptions that present tax rates are continued, and that
profits on the national income definition have been determined else-
where in the model, what is the best procedure for estimating federal
corporate profits tax liability?' The ratio of corporate profits tax
to corporate profits could be affected by any of the following :2
1.Secular drift in the ratio to profits of any of the items which are
included in taxable profits but excluded from national income
profits, such as intercorporate dividends, capital gains, or profits
of mutual financial intermediaries
2. Secular drift in the ratio to profits of items excluded from taxable
profits but included in national income profits, such as depletion,
state corporate income taxes, profits of Federal Reserve banks,
or tax-exempt interest
1Althoughfive points of the corporate tax are scheduled to expire at the end of this
fiscal year, this has been the case each year since 1954, and each year the rates have
been extended for another year.
2Adetailed reconciliation of national income profits arid the profits tax and their
Statistics of Income counterparts is given in one of the supplementary tables to the
national income accounts, e.g., U.S. Income and Output, Department of Commerce;
Table VII-19, p. 230.
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3. Secular drift in the ratio to profits of items taxed at special rates,
such as Western Hemisphere trade corporations or corporations
choosing the partnership option under the small-business lib-
eralization enacted in 1958
4. Secular drift in the ratio of losses to aggregate profits, since the
effects on tax liability of losses and profits are not symmetrical
5. Secular drift in the proportion of profits accruing to corporations
with net profits of $25,000 or less, because of the rudimentary
progressivity in the tax structure
It is doubtful that many, if any, of these reconciliation items would
appear among the list of variables in a model of manageable size.
How much precision is lost by ignoring some or all of them?
Table 1 shows profits and taxes on the two bases over a ten-year
period. The bottom part of this table decomposes the ratios of na-
tional income profits to Statistics of Income profits, of taxes to profits
on a national income basis, and of national income taxes to Statistics
of Income taxes.
Aside from the recession years of 1954 and 1958, the Statistics of
Income ratio of taxes to profits (TR/R) has remained between 48.5
per cent and 49 per cent since the current rates went into effect in
1952. With recession years again omitted in order to approximate
conditions of stable growth, the ratio of Statistics of Income profits
to national income profits (R/C) also shows no particular trend.
Thus changes in the reconciliation items, averaged over the cycle,
are negligible in size or else cancel out against others. However,
there is one item for which this is not the case. The major factor in
the decline of national income tax relative to Statistics of Income tax
(Tc/TR) is for credits against United States liability for foreign taxes
paid by foreign branches of United States corporations. These
credits, which quadrupled in the period 1948—57 (from$278
million to $1,053 million) while total profits were increasing about
a third, are included in liabilities reported in Statistics of Income
but excluded from the tax on a national income basis. In conse-
quence, the profits elasticity of tax on a national income basis under
conditions of stable growth may be as low as 0.91 or 0.92 if foreign
taxes paid by United States corporations continue to grow faster
than United States taxes. This compares with the approximately
unit elasticity of taxes on a Statistics of Income liability basis.
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TABLE 1
CORPORATE PROFITS ANT) PROFITS TAX, NATIONAL INCOME BASIS
COMPARED TO STATISTICS OF INCOME, 1948—58
(dollars in millions)
Tc
Federal TR R C
Corporate Federal Taxable Corporate
Income Tax Corporate Corporate Profits
Liability, Income Tax, Income, Before Tax,
National Statistics Statistics National
Income Basisa of Incomeb of Incomeo Income Basisd
1948 $11,813 $11,920 $32,772 $33,000
1949 9,773 9,817 27,093 26,370
1950 15,711 15,929 40,032 40,628
1951 19,110 19,623 41,150 42,153
1952 17,088 17,597 36,090 36,691
1953 17,806 18,256 37,261 38,311
1954 16,417 16,823 34,859 34,061
1955 20,869 21,741 44,663 44,862
1956 20,195 21,364 44,124 44,683
1957 19,916 20,582 42,369 43,208
1958 17,657 18,814 39,612 37,410
x
C R C
1948 • .9910 • 0.9931
1949 • .9955 • 1.0274
1950 • .9863 • 0.9853
1951 • .9740 e 0.9762
1952 .4657 .9711 .4876 0.9836
1953 .4648 .9754 .4900 0.9726
1954 .4820 .9759 .4826 1.0234
1955 .4652 .9599 .4868 0.9956
1956 .4520 .9453 .4842 0.9875
1957 .4609 .9676 .4858 0.9806
1958 .4720 .9385 .4750 1.0589
Survey of Current BusinessandU.S.Income and Output, Departmentof Commerce.
Excludesexcess profits tax (Statistics of Income, Internal Revenue Service)for 1950—54
b Statisticsof Income. Excludes excess profits tax for 1950—54.
Net income, returns with net income, from Statistics of Income, less following items
(from Statistics of Income or Treasury Department): Net operating loss deduction;
net income as reported on small business returns (Form 1 120-s); 85 per cent of domestic
dividends; special credits, life insurance companies; and special credits, Western Hemi-
sphere Trade Corporations.
dSurveyof Current Business and U.S. Income and Output.
oTaxrates differed from those presently in effect. -
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Individual Income Taxes
As with the corporation income tax, there are a number of differ-
ences between the tax base established in the revenue code and its
personal income counterpart in the national income accounts. Dif-
ferences include both taxable nonincome, such as capital gains, and
nontaxable income, such as transfer payments. Progressive rates
might also, be expected to affect the trend in yields.
Table 2, bottom, records the two components of the trend in
taxes as a percentage of personal income. Actual yields have been
adjusted for the different rates in effect prior to 1954 to obtain a
longer perspective.
Contrary to what might be expected under a system of progressive
rates, there is no discernible trend in the ratio of taxes to taxable
income. The ratio of taxable to total personal income does, however,
rise substantially. It can be shown, although I have not included the
data here, that this growth is due to the increasing proportion of
personal income in the total of incomes reported in taxable returns,
rather than to the other reconciliation items. This confirms that
exemptions, rather than progressive rates, are the major source of
income sensitivity of the individual income tax.
The combined effects of stable yields relative to taxable income
and of growing taxable income relative to total personal income has
been a personal income elasticity of taxes at unchanged rates,
measured for comparable stages of the cycle in order to approximate
stable growth conditions, of 1.25 or more. A faster rate of growth
of per capita income than in the period from which this estimate is
drawn would mean a still higher elasticity, since exemptions per
taxpayer (with no change in law) can reasonably be assumed more
or less constant.
Excise Taxes
Table 3 records federal indirect business tax accruals (mainly
excises) adjusted for the estimated effects of tax rate changes. It
appears that federal indirect business taxes have had a GNP elas-
ticity of slightly more than 0.8 in the period since 1952, aside from
changes in rates. This may understate the GNP elasticity for pur-
poses of a stable growth model, since GNP in recent years has been
below potential; and there is a relatively high marginal response of
the automobile excise tax to cyclical changes in GNP. On the other
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TABLE 2















1948 15.44 85.5 18.06 74.7 210.4
1949 14.54 85.5 17.00 71.6 208.3
1950 18.38 89.6 20.51 84.3 228.5
1951 24.23 105.1 23.05 99.4 256.7
1952 . 27.80 114.3 24.32 107.5 273.1
1953 29.43 114.3 25.75 115.7 288.3
1954 26.67 100.0 26.67 115.3 289.8
1955 29.61 100.0 29.61 128.0 310.2
1956 32.73 100.0 32.73 141.5 332.9
1957 34.39 100.0 34.39 149.4 351.4
1958 34.34 100.0 34.34 149.3 360.3
l959p 38.90 100.0 38.90 167.2 383.3
- 11
Y — TI Y
1948 .0858 .242 .355
1949 .0816 .237 .344
1950 .0898 .243 .369
1951 .0898 .232 .382
1952 .0891 .226 .394
1953 .0893 .223 .401
1954 .0920 .231 .398
1955 .0955 .231 .413
1956 .0983 .231 .425
1957 .0979 .230 .425
1958 .0953 .230 .414
1959p .1015 .233 .436
p =preliminary.
a Statistics of Income, Internal Revenue Service.
b First-bracket rate, current year, divided by first-bracket rate, 1959, times 1.03
(for years prior to 1954) for approximate effect of reduction in liabilities in Revenue
Code of 1954.
Joseph A. Pechman, "What Would a Comprehensive Income Tax Yield?" Tax
Revision Compendium, Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959,
I, 257; and Statistics of Income.
dDepartmentof Commerce.
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1952 10.52 10.18 2.93
1953 11.19 10.83 2.96
1954 10.06 10.46 2.88
1955 11.04 11.65 2.93
1956 11.60 11.94 2.84
1957 12.21 12.28 2.77
1958 11.88 12.22 2.75
1959 13.04 13.48 2.79
1960 14.00 14.00 2.77
a Departmentof Commerce.
b Adjusted for the estimated revenue effects of: (1) the 1954 Excise Tax Reduction
Act; (2) the increase in gasoline and highway-user tax rates in 1956 and 1959; and
(3) the repeal of the excise tax on passenger transportation in 1958.
hand, tobacco and alcohol, for which income elasticity is probably
below unity, account for about half of federal excise taxes. On bal-
ance, the GNP elasticity for the system of federal excises under
conditions of stable growth and unchanged rates may be taken to
be about 0.85.
Contributions for Social Insurance
A calculation of the long-run income elasticity of federal contribu-
tions for social insurancemainly the payroll taxes to finance old
age, survivors, and disability insurance—runs into a number of
obstacles. Actual data for past years is clouded by changes in cov-
erage, tax rates, and limits on taxable wages, all of which affect the
income elasticity of taxes. For related reasons, a projection based
only on current rates would be of little use.
For federal employment taxes, unlike other taxes, specific changes
in rates already scheduled in the present law are highly likely, and
should therefore be put into a projection. The proper treatment of
the limit on taxable wages, for which no changes are scheduled
under the present law, is less certain.
For given coverage and tax rates, a limit on taxable wages implies
an income elasticity of yield of less than unity and a declining elas-
ticity with the passage of time as the mean of the frequency distribu-
tion of wages by size in covered industries rises relative to the limit.
239FEDERAL SECTOR. IN NATIONAL INCOME MODELS
TABLE 4
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR FEDERAL OLD-AGE,




Limit on in First YearAdjusted as
Annual Actual Combined of Each Per Cent of
TaxableContributionsPayroll Wage LimitTotal Wages
Wages Tax Rates (billions)and Salaries
1951 $3,600 $3.32 3.0% $3.32 1.94%
1952 3,600 3.76 3.0 3.76 2.03
1953 3,600 3.98 3.0 3.98 2.01
1954 3,600 5.14 4.0 3.85 1.96
1955 4,200 5.95 4.0 5.95 2.82
1956 4,200 6.55 4.0 6.55 2.88
1957 4,200 7.87 4.5 6.99 2.93
1958 4,200 7.90 4.5 7.02 2.93
1959 4,800 9.74 5.0 9.74 3.77
1960 4,800 12.05 6.0 10.04 3.70
'Department of Commerce.
Table 4 shows, by subperiods in which the taxable wage limit was
constant, accrued taxes adjusted for rate changes (but not for cov-
erage). Over each of the two four-year intervals—l951—54 and
1955—58—the elasticity of taxes at constant rates relative to total
wages and salaries appears equal to or even slightly greater than
unity. This probably reflects the influence of periodic legislative
extensions of coverage under the system. Coverage has now reached
such high percentages of the labor force that future extensions will
perforce be nil or at most at a much slower pace than in the past.
On the other hand, the limit has in the past been lifted by legislation
at fairly regular intervals. It can probably be safely assumed that
this practice will continue with rising productivity and average in-
come. All things considered, an elasticity of yield of approximately
unity (aside from rate changes) seems reasonable. To this one would
add the effects of scheduled increases in tax rates.
OASDI actuaries duck the problem of a limit on taxable wages
in both their benefit and tax calculations by assuming constant aver-
age wages in covered employment (contrary to all past experience).
From the standpoint of actuarial soundness of the insurance system,
this is roughly equivalent to assuming periodic changes to increase
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the limit on taxable wages to keep pace with rising productivity and
wage rates.
TOTAL RECEIPTS
The long-run behavior of federal revônues obviously hinges on the
distribution of income shares between corporations and individuals.
There is the argument, of course, that the profits share in GNP
can be expected to continue declining, as it has apparently been
doing over the last decade or so. Because of the high marginal
federal tax return from the profits share, such a tendency would
reduce the GNP elasticity of the over-all federal revenue system.
In passing, however, a counterargument can be noted, which holds
that the apparent decline in the profits share is related to the opera-
tion of the economy below potential in recent years, and this trend
would not occur under conditions of stable growth at unchanged
rates of factor utilizations. A continuation of the recent growth in
capital consumption allowances, relative to GNP, would also reduce
the GNPelasticityof taxable incomes and taxes. Again, however,
this may be a phenomenon related to the below-potential operation
of the economy. In any event, an analysis of income shares is out-
side the scope of this paper, and I am content to let this be deter-
mined elsewhere in the model.
Table 5givesan illustrative ten-year projection of federal receipts
based on the elasticities discussed above, assuming a 5andone-
quarter per cent annual growth rate in money GNP and assuming
that the major income shares—profits, wages and salaries, and total
personal income—all move proportionately to GNP. A minor re-
distribution of relative income shares would not alter the basic
conclusions suggested by Table 5,norare these conclusions seriously
affected by my use of actual 1960 receipts as a base rather than a
hypothetical high-employment estimate. I have also chosen to ignore
in this illustration two relatively minor changes in tax rates—the
temporary doubling of the federal portion of the unemployment
payroll taxes for two years starting January 1, 1962, and the approx-
imately $150 million increase in highway user taxes on July 1, 1961.
The important points are that the tendency of individual income
taxes to rise a good deal faster than personal income, and the in-
creases in OASDI payroll taxes already scheduled in the present
law, more than outweigh the effect of less than unit elasticities of the
federal excise system and corporation income tax accruals. The GNP
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TABLE 5
ILLUsTRATIVE TEN-YEAR PROJECTION OF FEDERAL 1960 1970

























Total receipts 96.0 177.2
Total receipts as per cent of GNP 19.0% 21.1%
Assuming 3.5 per cent per year real growth in GNP, a 1.75 per cent increase per
year in the GNP deflator, and unit GNP elasticity of corporate profits, personal income,
and wages and salaries.
bProfitselasticity of tax of 0.92.
CPersonalincome elasticity of tax of 1.25.
dGNPelasticity of tax of 0.85.
Wages and salaries elasticity of tax of 1.0, plus increases scheduled in present law
in combined rate on employers and employees, from 6 per cent in 1960 to 9.25 per cent
by 1970.
'Wages and salaries elasticity of tax of 1.0.
elasticity of the total system under these assumptions works out to
be on the order of over 1.2. Expressed differently, assuming stable
growth, constant income shares, and present tax rates (plus the
scheduled OASDI increases), federal revenues would rise from 19 per
cent of GNP in 1960 to 21 per cent in 1970.
I hope it is clear that I am forecasting neither 5andone-quarter
per cent growth nor unchanged unemployment ratios. The purpose
of this projection is to bring out certain features of the federal rev-
enue system—particularly its potentially high GNP elasticity—not
to forecast revenues. For forecasting, tax receipts have to be solved
for simultaneously with the values for their respective bases. These
obviously depend not only on private income-spending relationships,
but on the level of federal spending as well.
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LONG-RANGE PROJECTIONS OF FEDERAL SPENDING
Long-run projections of federal spending are usually done in terms
of ranges or alternatives, such as "high," "low," and "medium."
The very wide margin allowed for possible error in the form of a
difference between the "high" and the "low," typically amounting
to several percentage points of the gross national product, has lim-
ited the usefulness of some of these projections. In what follows, it
will be argued that the usual projections of total federal spending
are too timid in this respect—it is possible to forecast with some
confidence within a smaller range than is usually done.
The model-builder attempting a long-range projection of govern-
ment spending is faced with several decisions right at the outset.
In dealing with the public sector, the model-builder should be as
explicit as Otto Eckstein was in stating whether he is prescribing
what he thinks ought to be or whether he is forecasting what the
political process is likely to produce.3 Although exercises of both
types are useful, ambiguous ones are not. While intending no slight
to projections of the prescription type, provided they are clearly
labeled as such, my following remarks are addressed to the forecast
variety.
With defense outlays accounting for half or more of the federal
budget, and with nonzero probabilities for both general war on the
one hand and disarmament on the other, some explicit assumption
about international politics is required. One approach is to make
alternative projections based, say, on war, cold war, and disarma-
ment.4
Since these probably imply profound differences all through the
economy, including the level of nondefense as well as defense spend-
ing, the mix of total output and the resultant value per man-hour
of input, as well as profit rates in the private economy and the size
of the labor force, this approach logically calls for a corresponding
number of complete economic models.
Either because there is far less material with which to construct a
Otto Eckstein, Trends in Public Expenditures in the Next Decade, Committee for
Economic Development, April 1959, p. 14.
'Forexample, the ten-year projection of federal budget trends published by the
Bureau of the Budget in January 1961 included, in addition to "high," "low," and
"medium" projections, which were based broadly on "no marked change in the inter-
national situation," a fourth alternative based on the possibility of controlled dis-
armament.
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confident projection of expenditure trends under the general war or
disarmament alternatives, or because the forecaster assigns rela-
tively low probabilities to these two alternatives, most projections
are based broadly on a continuation of international tension as it
has prevailed for most of the years since World War II. Within this
broad assumption, however, there would appear ample residual un-
certainty in the defense-spending area. That fluctuations in the level
of defense spending can be caused by Berlin crises, sputniks, and
intervening periods of lesser tension has been amply demonstrated.
This uncertainty is typically handled by making a "high," a "low,"
and a "medium" defense projection sometimes embracing a quanti-
tatively very wide range (e.g., Table 6).
TABLE 6
SELECTED TEN-YEAR PRoJwrIoNs OF FEDERAL DEFENSE SPENDING,
TO 1968, 1970, AND 1971
Range from
"Low" to "High"
Defense Concept Year Projections
Projector Used Projected (billions)
Otto Eckstein& Dept. of Defense,
military functions 1968 $15
Bureau of the Budgetb Major national
security° 1970 10
National Planning
Associationd National securitye 1971 57
Otto Eckstein, Trends in Public Expenditures in the Next Decade, Committee for
Economic Development, 1959. Both the high and low projections assume that disarma-
ment is excluded and that the world situation will not change in a fundamental way.
b Ten- Year Projection of Federal Budget Expenditures, Bureau of the Budget, 1961.
Both high and low assume no important changes in international conditions.
"Department of Defense, military functions, plus military assistance, atomic energy,
stockpiling, and defense production expansion.
d National Planning Association, 1961 Projection Series. Low assumes a substantial
easing of international tensions. High assumes the international situation requires a
greatly enlarged program for armaments or civil defense. However, neither disarma-
ment nor war is apparently assumed.
°Majornational security plus space and civil defense.
A similar dilemma confronts the forecaster in the area of non-
defense spending. If a forecast rather than a prescription is desired,
the cannot just total up the "needs" for public spend-
ing, but must make a judgment as to what balance Congress and
the Executive will strike between the pressures for particular program
increases and the pressures for minimizing various tax burdens. He
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also has to judge what resolution will be made of the sometimes con-
flicting advice on the proper size of the budget surplus at various
stages of the business cycle.
I do not want to minimize the forecaster's problem in sorting
through these various uncertainties. But the usual projection allows
a larger margin for contingencies than I think is really necessary.
At this point, I will simply state those aspects of the usual forecast
that give rise to unnecessary imprecision. Subsequently, I will present
some historical evidence that argues for a modification of the usual
approach.
Almost all the long-range projections I have seen begin by decom-
posing the federal budget into major functions or program areas,
such as defense, agriculture, health, veterans, transportation, etc.,
and then making for each portion a high, a low, and a medium
projection. The high projection for the total budget is then taken
as the sum of the individual program. highs, etc. However, there is
good reason to believe that the pieces so projected are nonadditive.
Certainly the high and the low projections are not properly con-
structed by addition, and perhaps the medium is not as well.
Another mistake, in my opinion, is a tendency to exaggerate the
flexibility in the size of the budget available from slight alternation
in the political complexion of the legislative and executive branches.
Peacock and Wiseman5 for the United Kingdom and Kendrick6
and Cohn7 for the United States have given very similar descriptions
of the growth in central government expenditures. Noting a long-
run tendency for such outlays to grow faster than population and
prices, all three studies have stressed the unevenness of this growth
process. Peacock and Wiseman have put forward an interesting thesis
to account for the pattern of alternating increase and stability in
government expenditures in democratic societies. The basic proposi-
tions in this thesis are that (1) expenditures tend to be broadly condi-
tioned by revenue availability; and (2) unless society is subjected to
unusually violent pressures or disturbances, people's ideas about the
"tolerable" burden of taxes tend to be fairly stable. A social dis-
turbance, such as war, destroys established conceptions and has a
Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditures in Great
Britain, Princeton for NBER, 1961.
6M.Slade Kendrick, A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures, New York,
NBER, 1955.
Samuel M. Cohn, "Economic Policy and the Federal Budget," Federal Accountant,
September 1959.
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lasting impact on expenditures, which Peacock and Wiseman call the
"displacement" effect. In the absence of upheaval, differences of
opinion about the desirable amount of taxation and expenditure,
and the conflict between efficiency through scale economies on the
one hand and local autonomy on the other, get resolved in favor of
the status quo. Any rise in spending during such periods, tends to be
at rather unspectacular rates.
Major wars are particularly cited not only as leaving a legacy of
veterans' pensions and interest on the public debt, but also as chang-
ing the notion of the tolerable level of taxation. In theory, Peacock
and Wiseman point out, displacements, can be negative as well as
positive and could be associated not only with wars but with periods
of runaway inflation, extraordinary unemployment, or cold war
defense outlays. In fact, however, World Wars I and II have been
the major displacements in British experience.
In United States experience, major wars—the War of 1812, the
Civil War, and the First and Second World Wars—have clearly.
operated as "displacements" in the sense that Peacock and Wiseman
use the term (Table 7). Each of these wars operated to lift the level
of spending in the postwar period, not oniy for war-related outlays
such as public debt, interest, and veterans' benefits but for civil out-
lays as well. The Great Depression was also a "displacement" in
United States experience, giving rise to a gradual increase in federal
cash payments from 2.8 per cent of gross national product in 1929
to 10 per cent in 1940. Displacement effects of smaller,wars have
generally been less significant. The Korean War was an exception
in this respect, leaving a heritage of military outlays substantially
higher than prewar. The Mexican War was, a minor, but permanent,
type of displacement; the Spanish-American War, temporary as
well as minor.
In the last century and the first part of this, expenditures in the
periods between major displacements probably rose little if any more
than could be accounted for by increases in population and prices,
and probably less rapidly than the gross national product. .Since
World War II, however, spending in. periods between displacements
has risen somewhat faster than the gross national product. A greater
income elasticity of the revenue system may well account for this
difference.
Long-range forecasts of federal expenditures (e.g., Table 8) are
frequently made conditional on the political complexion of the ex-.
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TABLE 7
DISPLACEMENT EFFECT OF MAJOR WARS ON THE LEVEL OF FEDERAL SPENDING,










War of 1812 (constant dollars









Total 1.48 3.32 2.65










Total 3.34 18.81 8.18

























Total 10.36 38.64 15.51
SOURCE: M. Slade Kendrick, A Century and a Half of Federal Expenditures, New
York, NBER, 1955; and U.S. Income and Output, Department of Commerce, 1958.
Years are fiscal years. Expenditures are federal consolidated cash budget payments
to the public. -
ecutiveand legislative branches, as though to imply that rather
abrupt changes in public sector spending might occur as the result
of a change in the balance of political power between "spenders"
and "nonspenders." For example, Otto Eckstein described his projec-
tions as assuming a continuation of the recent balance of political
forces with respect to federal spending in his "medium" projection,
economy in both Administration and Congress in his "low" figures,
and stronger expenditure stress in his "high" figures. The Bureau of
the Budget gave a similar explanation of the differences between its
high, low, and medium projections. Some hedging by the forecaster
on this account is clearly prudent. But it is doubtful if a large range
is reasonably required. to take care of this source of uncertainty.
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TABLE 8
SELECTED TEN-YEAR TOTAL FEDERAL SPENDING,
TO 1968, 1970, AND 1971
Range from
"High" to "Low"
Federal Expenditure Year Projection as
Projector Concept Used ProjectedPer Cent of GNP
Otto Ecksteina Consolidated cash 1968 17.3—21.7
Bureau of the Budgetb Consolidated cash 1970 15.2—22.0
National Planning National income
Associationo and product 1971 13.7—18.4
Otto Eckstein, Trends in Public Expenditures in the Next Decade, Committee for
Economic Development, 1959.
bTen-Year Projection of Federal Budget Expenditures, Bureau of the Budget, 1961.
(Disarmament alternative disregarded in computing range shown above.)
°NationalPlanning Association, 1961 Projection Series. Upper end of range taken
from the "high government, low growth" alternative; lower end from the "high con-
consumption, fast growth" alternative.
Consider the difficulty a political party would have in justifying
significant changes in tax rates. Any such change directly raises the
question of the proper allocation of resources between public and
private use. A proposed increase of any significant size is likely to
arouse accusations of fiscal irresponsibility; and a proposed de-
crease, complaints of neglect of vital public needs. There are few
fighting words more charged than these in our political vocabularies.
Attitudes do change, of course, but there can be little doubt of the
high degree of sanctity in existing tax rates—the status quo raises far
fewer political arguments than movements in either direction. Further-
more, attitudes favoring balanced budgets are widespread. Conse-
quently, any proposed reduction that is to be made on the basis of
an actual realized surplus in the budget, gets strong support; but it
is a clever feat indeed, since a cutback in spending to pave the way
for lower taxes would ordinarily be self-defeating. Similar feedback
effects may also help to limit changes in the other direction if spending
increases are inflationary, or even if they are just thought to be so.
Supporting, although admittedly not conclusive, evidence for the
proposition that sudden changes in the balance of power between
"spenders" and "nonspenders" are unlikely is furnished by the two
most recent changes in national administration. The Eisenhower
administration was largely unsuccessful in its announced plan to
reduce government spending relative to the gross national product.
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Defense spending was reduced from its Korean War peak (Chart1)
but remained well above its prewar percentage of grossnational
product. Nondefense spending (measured in national incometerms)
was increased more than GNP the first year in office,slightly less
than GNP in 1955 and 1956, and faster than GNP thereafter except
for a one-year leveling in 1960.
Expenditures proposed by the Kennedy administration for fiscal
1963 as a percentage of 'projected gross national product represent
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a slight decline from fiscal 1962 to about the same percentage as in
fiscal 1961.
It must also be remembered that Congress, which is probably still
less subject to abrupt change than the executive, has at least as much
to say in spending matters.
As further evidence of the high degree of inertia in an existing
revenue system, it may be noted that, since 1948, the only major
changes in tax rates—in 1950, 1951, and 1954—were associated with
the increase and subsequent decrease of Korean War defense ex-
pepditures. The 1948 tax cut enacted by the Republican Congress
over President Truman's veto comes closer to representing a "dis-
placement" of a domestic political kind. But a large part of the credit
is due to a most unusual condition of the federal budget in fiscal
1948—a surplus larger by a factor of over five than any ever achieved
before or since, and due more to a fortuitous than a planned simul-
taneous reduction in defense, foreign aid, veterans' readjustment,
and agricultural price support expenditures.
The hypothesis that there is a strong tendency for total federal
spending to be set according to revenues available under existing
tax rates does not imply that each component follows the same gen-
eral time path. Some expenditures show considerable year-to-year
fluctuation for business cycle or other reasons. Particularly volatile
are: (1) farm price supports, which can fluctuate because of weather
conditions here or abroad; (2) defense outlays, which can fluctuate
quite aside from changes in program direction if contracts let under
obligational authority are allowed to bunch up, causing a subse-
quent bunching of expenditures; (3) interest payments on the public
debt, which vary with changes in market rates of interest; (4) unem-
ployment compensation; (5) net mortgage purchases or sales, which
are determined largely according to mortgage market conditions;
and (6) one-time major outlays, such as subscriptions to international
finance organizations. A bunching of fluctuations in individual
programs can and does cause year-to-year aberration in total spend-
ing from what would be a stable trend.
That a comparatively stable trend in total federal spending over a
period of years is consistent with widely divergent movements in
major components is illustrated graphically in Charts 1 and 2. In
Chart 1, total federal national income expenditures are divided into
defense purchases and nondefense. Three points may be noted.
First, leaving the Korean War years aside, total outlays as a per-
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centage of GNP appear well represented by a linear upward trend,
with deviations around the trend averaging less than 1 per cent of
GNP. Second, the impact of Korean
expenditure total was somewhat dampened
CHART 2






















Trumanadministration tofinance part of the costs of the war by
holding down nondefense spending. Third, the steady upward trend
since the end of the Korean War is the net result of a more rapid
upward trend in nondefense outlays and a decline in defense outlays
relative to GNP. It is, of course, not surprising that the trend of a
total lies between the trends of its components. But it is interesting
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that the net trend just happens to work out at about the same GNP
elasticity as the 1954 revenue code (combined with periodic increases
in social security payroll tax rates). This suggests that the "offset
factor" operates with respect to defense and nondefense spending,
and not just among the nondefense programs, at least when there
is no shooting war. Chart 2 suggests the large extent to which fluctua-
tions and divergent trends in major components of nondefense
spending have tended to offset one another.
Allowance for an "offset factor" in long-range projections of
federal spending is not a new principle. The National Planning As-
sociation, for example, in its annual projection series, allows for
considerably higher nondefense spending in its "low defense" alterna-
tive than in its "high defense" alternative. Similarly, the Budget
Bureau's ten-year projection recommended using the "high" non-
defense projection as the complement to its disarmament alternative
on defense. However, I would recommend even stricter rules. In the
absence of disarmament or hot war, a one-for-one offset between
defense and nondefense—not year-by-year, certainly, but averaged
over a period of years—appears by far the best bet for the forecaster.
In summary, for long-range projections, I would venture a forecast
with the following elements: (1) in the absence of a hot war or dis-
armament, significant changes from current rates of tax for the major
sources of federal revenue are unlikely, except for the social security
tax rate increases built in under current law; (2) budget policy will
continue to aim at small surpluses in years of relatively high employ-
ment; (3) total expenditures will rise slightly as a percentage of GNP
in line with the greater-than-unity GNP elasticity of the present
revenue system; (4) year-to-year volatility in some program areas
will produce temporary deviations from trend in total federal spend-
ing from time to time; (5) ignoring temporary fluctuations, level or
declining trends in some program areas will be offset in time by
increases elsewhere.
To repeat an earlier injunction, these elements should be viewed
as equilibrium conditions, not as the means for mechanically trans-
forming some assumed growth rate into a forecast of expenditures.
The growth rate, the major income shares, revenues, and expenditures
must all be solved simultaneously. For many reasons, including
three mentioned below, it is obviously not prudent to take 5 per cent
or any other growth rate for granted.
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SOME ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THIS PROJECTION
Among the implications of the projection outlined above, I. would
flag three as raising interesting problems for policy-makers as well
as model-builders. In the first place, although total spending can,
in my opinion, be forecast reasonably well (at least in relation to
GNP) the composition of the total as between goods and services
purchases, on the one hand; and grants, transfers, and subsidies,
on the other, is considerably less predictable. This will• depend prin-
cipally on the trend of defense spending, which accounts for up-
ward of 85 per cent of federal purchases of goods and services but
only about 50 per cent of total federal expenditures on income and
product account. Nondefense spending largely takes the form of
grants, subsidies, and transfer payments. I do not believe the current
political process makes much allowance for the probability that,
from the standpoint of stable growth at unchanged rates of factor
utilization, grants, transfers, and subsidies probably carry consider-
ably lower revenue requirements per dollar of outlay than purchases
of goods and services. Moreover, the administrative and consolidated
cash budgets, which are the ones used for most decision processes,
include loans and mortgage purchases as well—items which are
excluded altogether from the national income tabulation and which
probably carry still lower revenue requirements from a stable growth
standpoint, but not from that of balancing the administrative or
cash budget.
A second implication of the tendency toward inertia in the federal
fiscal system in the periods between displacements might be labeled,
for lack of a more inspired name, the "tired program". effect. More
and more economists are moving away from the notion of personal
consumption as a simple function of current income, in favor of
wealth or, what amounts to much the same thing, permanent in-
come, as the more relevant independent variable. But to my knowl-
edge, the implications of federal spending behavior in the con-
text of a permanent-income consumption function have not been
explored.
The "tired program" effect can be illustrated by an example.
Suppose a law is enacted according to which every red-headed per-
son becomes eligible for federal transfer payments of, say, $50 a
month for the rest of his life. Obviously, the enactment of such a
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program will release substantial sums for private spending relative
to the initial amount of federal outlay. Red-heads would receive
not only the first month's benefit check, but also a much larger
asset in the form of entitlement to future benefits—an asset in many
cases liquid enough to be transformed into a substantial sum of
cash at a commercial bank. Subsequent federal outlays under such
a program would come close to being capital transfers in a national
income sense—an exchange of one liquid asset for another (cash).
Old programs seldom die, and the growth of federal spending dur-
ing one of our so-called inertia periods between two displacements
is likely to be made up much more of the growth of old programs
than the initiation of new ones. As a consequence, the total income-
generating effects of federal spending during such a period are prob-
ably subject to decay, at least relative to potential gross national
product.
Something analogous, of course, takes place on the revenue side
of the budget. The initiation of a new• tax has, through a process of
capitalization, negative effects on asset values or permanent income
in addition to its effects on current income. These depressing effects
on aggregate demand subsequently decay with the passage of time,
similar to the decay of the stimulating effects of expenditures under
old programs.
Offhand, since the combined income and asset impact decays for
both receipts and expenditures during an inertia period, one might
be willing to judge that there is no a-priori reason to assume a sec-
ular trend one way or the other in the net impact of federal behavior
on aggregate demand. However, if I reason correctly, there is one
a priori reason for judging that the secular trend during an inertia
period may in fact be toward a reduced stimulus to aggregate de-
mand by the federal budget. Suppose the balanced budget multiplier
effect, according to which expenditures—at least for goods and serv-
ices—add more to aggregate demand than is deducted by an equal
amount of taxes, applies to the asset as well as the income effects
of government activity. Whatever its value, if the balanced budget
multiplier is constant, if it applies to asset as well as income effects,
and if there is no compensating change in the composition of federal
outlays, the multiplier would attach to a successively smaller com-
bined income-and-asset impact from federal spending less federal
taxes during an inertia period; and the resulting trend would be
toward a lower total impact on aggregate demand.
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To what extent the tired program effect may be offset by the influ-
ence on expenditures of a greater-than-unity GNP elasticity of
federal revenues F am not competent to judge. Of course, the compo-
sition effect can be either aggravating or offsetting to the tired pro-
gram effect.
The third problem I would like to flag is that, while private income-
spending relationships probably change slowly,it would be fortuitous
indeed if they remained constant for as long as ten years. The ex-
penditure process described above seems less than ideally suited—
from the standpoint of stable growth at unchanged rates of factor
utilization—to making the federal budget compensate for any such
secular trends.
Short-Run Behavior of the Fiscal System—
the Built-in Stabilizers
My analysis of the short-run behavior of the federal fiscal system is
limited to the part which is fairly predictable—the automatic built-in
fiscal stabilizers. Considering their prominent place in the literature
on fiscal policy and public finance, there have been surprisingly few
attempts at empirical measurement of the built-in stabilizers. I will
report here only a brief summary of the results from my own re-
search in this field and some of the problems these raise for fiscal
policy analysis.
Mainly because the cyclical behavior of the various tax bases
differs widely from the secular behavior, the cyclical GNP elasticities
of the built-in stabilizers differ substantially from their secular elas-
ticities. Table 9 records the base elasticity of yield for the major
federal taxes during the postwar recessions and recoveries. It also
records the marginal changes in federal surplus or deficit on account
of these and unemployment transfer payments as percentages of the
change in GNP during recession and recovery. In each case, actual
data have been adjusted to remove the effects of any legislative
changes during the recession or recovery period, so as to measure
only the automatic response. For all but the individual income tax,
the original data are those from the national income and product
accounts. For the individual income tax, two modifications to the
data were made. First, collections attributable to individual capital
gains were removed. Capital gains are excluded throughout the
national income and product statistics. Unless a model includes the
flow of capital gains, it seems only logical to exclude the tax on such
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TABLE 9
BUILT-IN FEDERAL FISCAL STABILIZERS, POSTWAR RECESSIONS AND RECOVERIES
Recessions Recoveries
IV-4811-53111-5711-6011-4911-541-58
to to to to to to to
Tax Base 11-4911-541-58 1-61 11-5011-5411-59
BASE ELASTICITY OF TAX YIELDa
,
CorporateprofitCorporate
tax accruals profits 0.850.840.90 1.010.810.880.89
Individual incomePersonal
tax accruals income 1.509.716.08 0.761.151.56
IndirectbusinessGross
taxes national
product 2.311.42 5.71 1.041.691.00
Contributions forWages and
social insurance salaries 0.750.440.96 2.010.820.760.84
CHANGE IN STABILIZER AS PER CENT OF CHANGE IN GROSS NATIONALpRODUCTa
Corporate profits tax accruals 25.336.429.9 57.121.113.215.6
Individual income tax accruals 2.3 7.511.1 17.9 7.4 8.2 8.9
Indirect business taxes 7.1 3.9 16.1 3.3 5.0 2.7
Contributions for social insur-
ance • 1.3 1.4 2.2 6.1 1.0 1.3 2.0
Unemployment compensation
(sign reversed) 10.514.1 9.1 25.0 1.1 2.6 2.0
SOURCE: Department of Commerce and Wilfred Lewis, Jr., Federal Fiscal Policy in
the Postwar Recessions, Brookings institution, 1962. "Recession" defined as period
from peak to trough in quarterly gross national product. "Recovery" defined as period
from GNP trough to quarter after which declines in unemployment ratio become
minor.
a Computed at constant (prerecession) tax rates.
bTaxdeclined while total personal income rose.
gains. Second, refunds and the nonwithheld portion of the tax were
placed on an accrual basis, so that the total tax would be as nearly
as possible on an accrued liability basis, as is the case with the other
taxes in the national income framework.
The fiscal effects of the built-in stabilizers should be distinguished
from their economic effects. While the corporation income tax is by
far the most important built-in stabilizer in terms of impact on the
federal budget, it is by no means clear that this is the case in terms
of economic impact.
The major stabilizers obviously, differ widely in their effects on
disposable personal income. A drop in individual income tax liabil-
ities, or a rise in unemployment compensation, for example, provide
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direct support to disposable personal income in the sense that they
cause disposable income to drop by less than it otherwise would in
an economic contraction. A decline, in corporate profits tax accruals,
on the other hand, affects disposable personal income only insofar
as it induces corporations to alter their employment policies or their
dividend payments. The indirect stabilizing effectiveness of a drop
in corporate income tax liabilities, by way of induced effects on
investment, may also be rather minor, at least for brief recessions of
the postwar variety in which corporate liquidity is well maintained
'or actually increases. Employee contributions for social insurance—
payroll taxes paid by employees—resemble income taxes and unem-
ployment benefits in having direct consequences for disposable per-
sonal income. Excise taxes, on the other hand, resemble the corpora-
tion income tax in having only indirect stabilizer effects on disposable
income. The employer contributions for social insurance can be
argued either way, although I have treated it as a "direct" stabilizer.
The fiscal effects of the direct stabilizers—individual income and
employment taxes and unemployment compensation—during post-
war contractions have ranged from $1.3 billion to $3.4 billion,
measured by changes from peak to trough, or from 14 per cent to
49 per cent of the change in gross national product. They have be-
come more important over the postwar period in their stabilizing
effectiveness for three main reasons. First, the increases in OASDI
payroll tax rates have increased the cycle sensitivity as well as the
level of these taxes. Second, the greater-than-unity GNP elasticity
of the individual income tax has caused a secular increase in the
average rate of tax and, apparently, has also increased its cycle
sensitivity. Finally, there is evidence of a growing responsiveness of
consumption expenditures to declines in disposable personal income.
This last-mentioned tendency enhances the importance of those
factors, like the built-in stabilizers, which cushion a decline in dis-
posable personal income.
The crude response of consumption to changes in disposable
personal income is, of course, not reliably measured directly from
ex post data. Annual data for years in most of which income is rising
yield a high marginal propensity to consume, roughly equal to the
average propensity, which is no fair indication of what happens in
recession. Comparison of actual changes in quarterly data, peak to
trough, can be misleading in the other direction, since substantial
declines or even increases in gross national product have been ac-
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companied by small decreases or even increases in consumption,
implying an absurdly low or negative marginal propensity to con-
sume. In the absence of a complete model based on underlying be-
havioral relations for the whole economy, an alternative method of
making rough approximations—one I believe is more indicative
than a comparison of actual data, whether annual or quarterly—
is to compare actual magnitudes at the trough with hypothetical
high-employment norms calculated on the basis of a few simplifying
assumptions.
Table 10 gives the results of a comparison of this kind. Hypothet-
ical high-employment norms for the trough quarter of each recession
were calculated by a linear interpolation of gross national product
from prerecession peak to recovery except in 1960—61, where 3 per
cent real growth, or 4.4 per cent in current dollars, was projected
starting at the peak in the second quarter of 1960. ("Recovery" is
defined as the quarter after which further reductions in the unem-
ployment rate became relativelysmall—I have used 111950, 111955,
and II 1959 as marking the end of recovery from the first three
postwar recessions). Business gross saving, disposable personal in-
come, and consumption are assumed to maintain their prerecession
ratios to gross national product under the hypothetical high-em-
ployment case. The differences between actual and hypothetical
high-employment data are arrayed to show the various offsets to
the fall in gross national product that account for the smaller drop
in consumption.
At the bottom of the table, the ratios of consumption "shortfall"
to GNP shortfall are first calculated as they occurred, and second,
as they would have occurred if there were no offset from the direct
stabilizers and if the resulting larger drop in disposable personal
income were reflected in consumption at the same rate as the actual
drop.
As reflected in this table, there has apparently been a growing
responsiveness of consumption to shortfalls in gross national product
and disposable personal income. Relative to gross national product,
the consumption drop has increased from 13 per cent in 1949 to
46 per cent in 1961. Consumption fell short by only 28 per cent of
the disposable personal. income shortfall in 1949, but reached 100
per cent in 1961.
Whether this growing income sensitivity of consumption reflects
the decline in liquid assets (relative to gross national product) in
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TABLE 10
EFFECTS OF DrnEcr FISCAL STABILIZERS ON CoNsuMPTIoN,
POST-WORLD WAR II RECESSIONS
(dollars in billions)
11-1949 11-1954 1-1958 1-1961
ACTUAL LESS HIGH EMPLOYMENT AT CYCLICAL TROUGH
Gross national producta —$12.3 —$22.0 —$27.0 —$22.6
Less:Indirect fiscal stabilizersb —2.7 —5.5 —6.0 —5.3
Gross business savingo —4.3 —2.1 —6.6 —4.1
Direct fiscal stabilizersd —1.5 —3.2 —4.5 —4.2
Other adjustmentse +2.0 —4.9 —0.5 +1.3
Equals: Disposable personal incomes —5.8 —6.3 —9.4 —10.3
Less:Personal savings —4.2 —1.8 —0.7
Equals: Personal consumption expend-
iturest —1.6 —4.5 —8.7 —10.3
RATIOS AND MULTIPLIERS
Ratios of shortfalls
Direct stabilizers to GNP 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.19
Consumption to disposable personal
income 0.28 0.71 0.93 1.00
Consumption to GNP
With offsets from direct stabilizers 0.13 0.20 0.32 0.46
Without offsets from direct stabi-
lizers 0.16 0.31 0.51 0.64
"Multiplier"—l/(l —)vIPCg):
With offsets from direct stabilizers 1.15 1.26 1.47 1.84
Without offsets from direct stabi-
lizers 1.19 1.45 2.06 2.79
SOURCE: Department of Commerce and Wilfred Lewis, Jr., Federal Government
Fiscal Policy in the Postwar Recessions, Brookings Institution, 1962.
aHypotheticalhigh-employment obtained by linear extrapolation from peak to
recovery, except in 1961, where growth at 3 per cent in real terms (4.4 per cent in cur-
rent dollars) was assumed starting in 11-1960.
bCorporateprofits tax accruals and indirect business taxes.
Total capital consumption allowances and corporate retained earnings. Hypothetical
high-employment value obtained from ratios to GNP prevailing at prerecession peak.
dIndividualincome tax accruals excluding capital gains (except 1961, which is on a
national income basis), unemployment compensation, and payroll taxes on employees
and employers.
°Residual,including changes in state-local taxes and transfers, changes in federal
taxes and transfers other than built-in stabilizers (including effects of tax rate change),
difference between national income and full-accrual basis for recording individual
income tax (except in 1961), inventory valuation adjustment, excess of wage accruals
over wage disbursements, and statistical discrepancy.
Hypothetical high-employment values obtained from ratios to GNP prevailing at
prerecession peak.
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the postwar period, or the steadily shortened interval between reces-
sions, in which consumers have time to rebuild desired income-debt
ratios before the next recession starts, I am none too certain. In
any event, this phenomenon has heightened the importance of the
direct fiscal stabilizers.
While the ratios shown must be regarded as only crude approxima-
tions to the slopes of the underlying analytical consumption func-
tions, their differences from one recession to the next do suggest to
me structural change. The significance of this can be interpreted in
the following fashion. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the
ratios of consumption shortfall to GNP shortfall were representative
of the marginal propensity to consume out of GNP (in Table 10
I have labeled them MPCU). Then the rate at which initial changes
in demand would tend to be multiplied into total changes in gross
national product would approach l/(1 —MPGQ).
Calculated values of this multiplier are shown at the bottom of
Table 10. The implication of the steady increase in spread between
the multiplier values computed with and without the direct fiscal
stabilizers is that, while the stabilizers may have been of relatively
minor importance in the 1949 recession, they had acquired major
importance for the stability of the economy in 1961 •8
Conclusion
The model-builder looking for precise equations tying the federal
sector to the rest of the economy will be disappointed by this paper.
While I have suggested a method of approximating equilibrium
conditions for a projection of total federal spending over the long
run, important questions on the economic implication of these
conditions remain unanswered. Similarly, for the short run, the
fiscal effects of the built-in stabilizers are far more certain than their
economic effects. Finally, some evidence was furnished that the
basic structure of the ecOnomy—the basic environment in which the
fiscal system operates—may have changed significantly over the
course of the postwar period. All this serves to remind us that, in
the current state of the art, numerical results from our models must
still be seasoned with large elements of judgment in drawing con-
clusions for public policy purposes.
8The1.47 multiplier computed for 1957—58 by this method compares with a quite
differently estimated multiplier for that recession of 1.34 as computed by James S.
Duesenberry, Otto Eckstein, and Gary Fromm, "A Simulation of the United States
Economy in Recession," Econometrica, October 1960.
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COMMENT
BERT G. HICKMAN, Brookings Institution
Wilfred Lewis has proposed a novel method of measuring con-
sumption propensities in that section of his paper which deals with
automatic stabilizers. The purpose of this note is to explore the
properties of the new technique and to question the inferences which
Lewis has drawn from its application to the postwar recessions.
Lewis believes that his "shortfall" measure provides a better
approximation to the true recession value of the marginal propensity
to consume GNP (or disposable income) than does the ratio of the
actual change in consumption to the actual change in GNP (or
disposable income). Let us abstract for the moment from the obvious
statistical deficiencies of both methods and assume that the observed
values of consumption and income at both peak and trough fall
on the underlying behavioral (linear) consumption function for the
contraction period. Under that assumption, what is the relationship
between the two estimates of the slope of the consumption function?
Lewis's first step is to calculate what GNP would have been at the
time of the cyclical trough if the contraction had not occurred and
if, instead, GNP had increased at a steady arithmetic rate along a
high-employment path from the cyclical peak. In symbols:
(1)
where Yh is hypothetical high-employment GNP for the trough
quarter,is observed GNP at the peak, and H is the hypothetical
increase of GNP between the peak and trough quarters.
Next, Lewis assumes that the average propensity to consume
GNPwouldhave remained constant if the economy had moved
along the high-employment path; therefore, hypothetical high-em-




wherestands for observed consumption at the cyclical peak.
Finally, letandbe the observed values of consumption and
GNP at the cyclical trough. Then (Ch — and (Yh— are the
recession shortfalls of consumption and income below their high-
employment "norms." Lewis uses the ratio of the two shortfalls
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(Ch —C)
'I (Yh—Yg)
to estimate the value of the marginal propensity to consume during
the contraction.
To facilitate comparison of the ratio of shortfalls
ratio of actual changes in consumption and income,
us substitute (1) and (2) into (3) and simplify. The result is
The first term in the numerator of the right-hand expression of (4)
is the marginal propensity to consume as conventionally measured.
Now, suppose that the marginal — —
wereequal to the average
In that case, it is easy to see from (4) that the shortfall ratio would
have the same value as the ratio of actual consumption and GNP
changes, namely Yr,. This is because Ch has been assumed to lie
on a consumption function passing through the origin with slope
and ifalso fell on the same function, (Ch — Yh —
would necessarily equal —Cg)/( —
thatthe response of consumption to a cyclical decline of GNP
was the same as its responsea steady growth of GNP, and that is
contrary to both theory and observation. One expects the recession
value of the marginal propensity to consume GNP to be smaller
than the average propensity at the cyclical peak; that is, one expects
the consumption function during a contraction to be flatter than the
long-term consumption function passing through cyclical peaks.
Under the normal expectation that the value — —
is smaller than it follows from equation 4 that the shortfall
ratio overstates the value of the marginal propensity to consume
during a contraction. The overestimate will be greater, the greater
the difference in slope between the short- and long-run consumption
function. The degree of overstatement will also vary positively with
the ratio of Yh —to —which means that it will depend
on the amplitude and duration of the contraction and on the assump-
tion made about the high-employment growth rate.
One important reason for expecting consumption to fall much less











propensity at the cyclical peak.
Y1)
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cushioning effect on disposable personal income. Thus, there are
really two structural relationships underlying the response of con-
sumption demand to changes in GNP. The first is the relationship
between disposable personal income and GNP, and the second is
the relationship between consumption and disposable personal in-
come. If the structural functions are assumed to be linear within
the relevant range, then
5
Yis disposable personal income and the subscripts have their
previous meanings. Exactly the same relationship holds among the
several shortfall ratios, as can be seen immediately by substituting
the subscript h for p in (5).
Everything that was said earlier about the relationship between the
conventional and shortfall estimates of the marginal response of
consumption to GNP carries over to the corresponding estimates of
the marginal response of disposable income to GNP. That is, the
underlying functional relationship between disposable income and
GNP should be flatter during a period of contraction than during
a corresponding period of steady high-employment growth, because
of the operation of both the private (gross business saving) and fiscal
stabilizers. The shortfall ratio should, therefore, overstate the mar-
ginal response of disposable income to GNP during a contraction.
It is time now to turn to a comparison of the conventional and
shortfall estimates of the several marginal relationships during the
postwar contractions. Table 1 contains the shortfall estimates and is
similar to Lewis's Table 10. The principal difference between my
table and his is that my shortfall estimates are corrected for price
changes and his are not. It is preferable to deal with deflated figures,
since the underlying structural relationships are defined in real
terms.' The conventional estimates are also based on deflated figures
and are shown in Table 2.
'The use of deflated data introduces a complication into the treatment of disposable
income. When the functional relationship between GNP and disposable incOme is in
question, the latter should be expressed in the same prices as GNP. With regard to
consumption decisions, however, disposable income should be deflated by an index
of consumer prices. When the implicit price indexes of GNP and consumer goods
diverge, a corresponding divergence is created between the two versions of "real"
disposable income. In Tables 1 and 2, disposable income is deflated by consumer prices.
How much difference this makes in the computed relations between disposable income
and GNP is shown in the footnotes to the tables.
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TABLE 1
SHORTFALL ESTIMATES OF MARGINAL INCOME AND CONSUMPTION
PROPENSITIES, POST-.WORLD WAR II
(values in billions of 1954 dollars, seasonally adjusted quarterly totals at annual rates)
11-1949 11-1954 1-1958 1-1961
ACTUAL LESS HIGH EMPLOYMENT AT CYCLICAL TROUGH
Gross national producta —$11.9 —$21.9 —$24.7 —$20.2
Less:Direct fiscal stabilizersb —1.7 —3.2 —4.1 —3.6
Other itemso ' —5.5 —11.8 —11.0 —7.3
Equals: Disposable personal incomed —4.7 —6.9 —9.6 —9.3
Less:Personal savinge —4.4 —1.9 —0.7 —0.1
Equals: Personal consumption expend-
—0.3 —5.0 ' —8.9 —9.2
RATIOS AND MULTIPLIERS
Ratios of shortfalls:
Direct stabilizers to GNP 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.18
Disposable income to GNP (MP Y):
With offsets from direct stabiliz-
0.39 0.32 0.39 0.46
Without offsets from direct stàbi-
lizers 0.54 0.46 0.55 0.64
Consumption to disposable income 0.06 0.72 0.93 0.99
Consumption to GNP (MPG):
With offsets from direct stabilizers 0.03 0.23 0.36 0.46
Without offsets from direct stabi-
lizers 0.03 0.33 0.51 0.63
"Multiplier"—l/(l —MPG):
With offsets from direct stabilizers 1.03 1.30 1.56 1.85
Without offsets from direct stabi-
lizers 1.03 1.49 2.04 2.70
"Multiplier"—l/(l —MPY):
With offsets from direct stabilizers 1.64 1.47 1.64 1.85
Without offsets from direct stabi-
lizers 2.17 1.85 2.22 2.78
aHypotheticalhigh employment obtained by linear interpolation from peak to recov-
ery, except in 1961 where growth at 3 per cent per annum assumed starting in 11-1960.
bAsin Lewis's Table 10, except deflated by the implicit price index for GNF (1954 =
100).
Estimated as residual. In addition to items specified in Lewis's Table 10, includes
the difference between disposable income as deflated by the implicit price index for
consumer goods and services and what disposable income would be if deflated by the
implicit price index for GNP. If the latter index were used to deflate disposable income,
the successive shortfall estimates would be —5.0, —6.2, —8.5, and —9.3.,
dAsin Lewis's Table 10, except disposable personal income deflated by implicit
price index for consumer goods and services.
Residual.
As in Lewis's Table 10, except for conversion to 1954 dollars.
gIfdisposable income were deflated by the implicit price index for GNP, as discussed
in note c, the successive ratios of disposable income shortfall to GNP shortfall would be
0.42, 0.28, 0.34, and 0.46.
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TABLE 2
CONVENTIONAL ESTIMATES OF MARGINAL INCOME AND CONSUMPTION
PROPENSITIES, POST-WORLD WAR II CONTRACTIONS










CHANGE FROM PEAK TO TROUGH
Gross national product —$7.0 —$13.7 —$18.0 —$10.2
Less:Direct fiscal —1.7 —3.0 —3.2 —2.8
Other itemsb —4.1 —9.4 —10.0 —5.3
Equals: Disposable personal income° —1.2 —1.3 —4.8 —2.1
Less:Personal savingd —4.2 —1.5 —0.3 0.4
Equals: Personal consumption expend-
iture8 3.0 0.2 —4.5 —2.5
RATIOS AND MULTIPLIERS
Ratios of changes:
Direct stabilizers to GNP 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.27
Disposable income to GNP (MPY):
With offsets from direct 0.17 0.09 0.27 0.21
Without offsets from direct stabi-
lizers 0.41 0.31 0.44 0.48
Consumption to disposable income —2.50 —0.15 0.94 1.19
Consumption to GNP (MPC):
With offsets from direct stabilizers —0.43 —0.01 0.25 0.25
Without offsets from direct stabi-
lizers —1.025 —0.46 0.41 0.57
"Multiplier"—l/(l —MPC):
With offsets from direct stabilizers 1.33 1.33
Without offsets from direct stabilizers 1.69 2.33
"Multiplier"—l/(l —MPY):
With offsets from direct stabilizers 1.20 1.10 1.37 1.27
Without offsets from direct stabilizers 1.69 1.45 1.78 1.92
See note b of Table 1.
b See note c of Table 1. If disposable income were deflated by the implicit price index
for GNP, the successive changes in disposable income would be —1.4, —0.6, —3.8,
and —2.3.
cSeenote d of Table 1.
t1 See note e of Table 1.
eSee note fof Table 1.
if disposable income were deflated by the implicit price for GNP, as dis-
cussed in note b, the successive ratios of changes in disposable income and GNP would
be 0.20, 0.04, 0.21, and 0.22.
The first thing to notice is that the shortfall ratios considerably
understate the combined importance of the private and fiscal sta-
bilizers as offsets to the decline of GNP. Thus, according to the
shortfall estimates, the marginal response of disposable income to
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GNP (labeled MP Y) in the four contractions ranged from 0.32 to
0.46, whereas the conventional estimates lie between 0.09 and 0.27.2
As expected, the shortfall estimates are considerably larger than the
conventional ones. One way to gauge the importance of the disparity
is to calculate the corresponding theoretical multipliersa given
marginal propensity to consume disposable personal income. If the
latter is assumed to be unity, the marginal response of consumption
to GNP(MPG)would be the same as the marginal response of dis-
posable income to GNP (MP Y), as can be seen from equation 5
above. The implied limiting multiplier values under this assumption
are shown at the bottom of each table and range between 1.10 and
1.37 on the conventional basis and between 1.47. and 1.85 on the
shortfall basis.3
Observe also that the shortfall estimates understate the importance
of the direct stabilizers alone. As already discussed, the shortfall
method is biased toward overestimates of marginal consumption
propensities. For exactly the same reasons, the method will tend to
underestimate marginal saving propensities. A glance at the tables
will show that the shortfall estimates of the marginal response of
the direct stabilizers to GNP are indeed smaller than the conven-
tional estimates.
Thus, the absolute importance of the direôt stabilizers as income
offsets during contractions is understated by the shortfall estimates.
This is not true, however, of their importance relative to the com-
bined influence of the indirect and private stabilizers, since the
marginal response of the latter to GNP is also underestimated by the
shortfall method. Hence, when the theoretical multipliers with and
without direct stabilizers are compared under the assumption that
the marginal response of consumption to disposable income is unity,
it is found that their ratio is about the same under both estimating
2Thelow values for the 1953—54 contraction are misleading. Personal income taxes
were reduced about $3 billion at the beginning of 1954. After allowance for the effects
of a simultaneous increase in personal contributions for social security and for the
treatment of nonwithheld tax receipts in the national income accounts, it appears that
disposable income would have beenabout $1.5 billion lower in the second quarter
of 1954 were it not for the tax reduction. When allowance is made for the tax changes,
the shortfall and conventional estimates of the induced decline of disposable income
per dollar of decline in GNP become, respectively, 0.38 and 0.20—values which are
much closer to those for the other contractions.
When corrected for the tax changes discussed in note 2, the values for the 1953—54
•contraction become 1.26 and 1.62 on the conventional and shortfall bases, greatly
reducing the range of variation between the multiplier estimates for the several con-
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methods. For the most recent contraction; the multipliers with
and without direct stabilizers are 1.27. and 1.92 by the conventional
method and 1.85 and 2.78 by the shortfall method. In either case,
themultiplier without direct stabilizers is about 1.5 times that with
direct stabilizers.
With regard to the relationship between consumption and dis-
posable personal income, it will be recalled that Lewis gives con-
siderable stress to the upward progression of the shortfall ratios
during the successive postwar contractions, interpreting the data as
evidence of a "growing responsiveness of consumption expenditures
to declines in disposable personal income." It is important to remem-
ber, however, that the short-term relationship between consumption
and current disposable income has displayed considerable instability
during the postwar period, although rather more so before than
after 1953. It is especially doubtful that the observed consumption-
disposable income ratio for the 1949 contraction in either Table 1
or Table 2 has any significance as a measure of the marginal response
of consumption to disposable income. Lewis has argued that the
progression of his shortfall ratios is strong evidence of a change in
the net response of consumption to disposable income, on the grounds
that nonincome determinants of consumption may be assumed to be
constant during each brief recession, even- though changing during
the long intervals between recessions. In 1948—49, however, real
consumption expenditure rose $3.0 billion even as real disposable
income fell $1.2 billion (Table 2). Apparently these contrasting
movements were due principally to changes in instalment credit
regulations and to the increased availability of new automobiles
during the contraction—sales of automobiles were largely supply-
determined during the early postwar years, and production was
stepped up considerably during the contraction. In any event, it is
hard to credit the idea that the net response of consumers to a
$1 billion reduction of real income would, be a.$3billion increase
of real consumption expenditure..
There are similar difficulties with respect to the contraction of
1953—54. As Table 2 reveals, personal consumption expenditure in-
creased $0.2 billion and disposable income declined $1.3 billion
between the second quarters of 1953 and 1954. But this peak-to-
trough comparison is strongly affected by an upsurge of expenditure
during the last few months of the, contraction. Real consumption
actually fell $2.8 billion as disposable income dropped $1.7 billion
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between the second quarter of 1953 and the first quarter of 1954.
Consumption then rose $3.0 billion, as disposable income increased
only $0.4 billion during the second quarter of 1954. To view the
same facts a little differently, the ratios of the consumption and dis-
posable income shortfalls during the successive quarters of the con-
traction were 0.938, 1.567, 1.136, and 0.725. Notice that it is only
the last of these ratios that looks considerably lower than the trough
ratios of 1958 and 1961.
The marginal ratios based on peak-to-trough changes in consump-
tion and income for the contractions of 1957—58 and 1960—61 appear
somewhat more reasonable as estimates of the induced response of
consumption to decreases in disposable income. At least the con-
sumption and income changes are in the same direction. Notice,
however, that the implied marginal propensity to consume for
1960—61 is greater than one. Moreover, again there is evidence of
marked variability in the consumption-income relationship during
the course of each contraction. For example, the successive quarterly
shortfall ratios were 0.673 and 0.927 during the brief 1957—58 reces-
sion, and 1.824, 0.880, and 0.989 during the 1960—61 contraction.
With so much variability in the short-term relationship between
consumption and disposable income, and with such small move-
ments of disposable income, it is extremely hazardous to rest an
estimate of the marginal response of consumption to disposable
income on two observations alone, whether by the conventional or
the shortfall method. Still less is it justifiable to conclude on the
basis of four such estimates that a structural change in the responsive-
ness of consumer demand to decreases in disposable income has
occurred during the postwar years. The 1949 experience is clearly
a special case, and the remaining contractions differ much less than
is suggested by Lewis's comparison of shortfalls at the troughs.
Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that the shortfall
estimates of the marginal response of consumption to disposable
personal income during the successive contractions were entirely
accurate. What would such a trend toward greater sensitivity of
consumption to changes in disposable income imply about the mu!-
tiplier effects of autonomous changes in demand? It is easy to cal-
culate the implied limiting multiplier values from a combination of
the shortfall estimates of the consumption-disposable income rela-
tionship in Table 1 and the conventional estimates of the disposable
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income-GNP relationship in note 2 and Table The resulting
multipliers for the successive contractions are 1.01, 1.17, 1.34, and
1.26. These differences, while not insignificant, are not especially
striking. The reason, of course, is that the public and private income
stabilizers have exerted such a strong influence during the postwar
contractions that disposable income has declined by only a small
fraction of the decline in GNP. Under these conditions, even a high
marginal response consumption to disposable income can have
comparatively little effect on aggregate demand.
To sum up: the shortfall technique does not appear to be a
ising method for the estimation of marginal saving or consumption
propensities during contractions. It is subject to the same statistical
deficiencies as the more conventional comparisons of actual changes
in consumption or saving with those in income; and in addition,
it is inherently biased toward overestimates of consumption propen-
sities and underestimates of saving propensities. Neither the con-
ventional nor the shortfall method is adequate to deal with the
problem of variability in the short-term relationship between con-
sumption and disposable income. This last stricture is less applicable
to the more stable relationship between disposable income and
GNP, however; therefore, the conventional method may yield rea-
sonably accurate estimates of the marginal response of disposable
income to GNP, whereas the shortfall method seriously overstates
the response.
JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, Brookings Institution
Wilfred Lewis's interesting and perceptive paper discusses three
significant aspects of the federal sector of the United States economy:
(1) recent changes in its size and composition; (2) the long-run elas-
ticity of its revenue system; and (3) the contribution of the federal
stabilizers to economic stability. On all of these points, Lewis has
added a great deal to our knowledge; and my remarks are far the
most part oniy refinements of his major conclusions.
Long-Run Growth of the Federal Sector
Lewis agrees with the Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis that, with
the exception of periods of military, social, or economic upheaval,
4The reason for using the conventional estimates of the marginal relationship be-
tween disposable income and GNP is, of course, that the shortfall estimates give a
biased estimate of the response.
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government expenditures are broadly conditioned by the availability
of revenue. Lewis observes that, since the end of the adjustment fol-
lowing the Korean War, the ratio of federal expenditures to the
gross national product in the United States has fluctuated moder-
ately around a trend line which is tilted slightly upward. The. up-
ward tilt is explained by two factors: (1) the slight progressivity of
the federal tax system that is associated with the growth of the econ-
omy; and (2) periodic upward adjustments in payroll tax rates and
in the limit on taxable wages. Abstracting from recessions, Lewis's
advice to a forecaster of federal expenditures is to estimate federal
revenues at present tax rates, make an adjustment for any future
statutory payroll tax increases already enacted, and then subtract a
small amount (not specified) for the surplus. Needless to say, this
advice holds only on the assumption that the forecaster can predict
relative income shares ten years hence and that international tensions
will remain substantially unchanged.
The available statistical evidence and the history of Executive and
Congressional action on expenditures in recent years provide ample
support for this hypothesis. The ratio of federal expenditures (na-
tional income basis) to gross national product reached its post-
Korean low in 1956. Since then, the ratio has increased every year
except 1960. Between 1956 and 1963, the federal revenue system
remained virtually unchanged, with the exception of increased pay-
roll taxes in 1957, 1959, 1960, and 1962. Substantial deficits were
incurred in this period whenever unemployment exceeded about
5 per cent of the labor force; but the rate of growth of revenues at a
given level of unemployment has kept pace with the rate of growth
of expenditures.
•Lewis goes on to point out that the revenue constraint has a sub-
stantial impact on the composition of federal expenditures through
the "offset factor." If some high-priority programs require increased
outlays, other programs will be squeezed. Conversely, as some pro-
grams begin to taper off, other programs, which have been held
back for budgetary reasons, spurt forward. The offset effect is most
apparent between defense and nondefense programs, but it operates
among nondefense programs as well.
I have very little to add to Lewis's observations on these points
except to lament our continued failure to devise some government
machinery for determining the appropriate size and composition of
the federal budget. If Peacock and Wiseman and Lewis are right,
270FEDERAL SECTOR IN NATIONAL INCOME MODELS
the revenue-raising capacity of the particular revenue system in-
herited from the period after the last major war or crisis determines
central government expenditures for many years thereafter. It would
obviously be sheer coincidence if this particular level of expenditures
were the "right" level in the sense that it reflects even approximately
the needs and desires of the nation's citizens for government services.
I hasten to add that I am not saying that the level of government
expenditures determined by the inherited revenue system is either
too high or too low. I am saying only that, in all likelihood, this
level is wrong and that it is time to devise techniques for making
the correct decisions.
I also share Lewis's concern about the relative movements of pur-
chases of goods and services, on the one hand, and grants, subsidies,
transfers, and loans on the other. Lewis points out that, from the
standpoint of stable growth, grants, subsidies, and transfer payments
carry lower revenue requirements per dollar of outlay than pur-
chases of goods and services; loans and other credits carry even
smaller revenue requirements. Federal purchases as a percentage of
total federal expenditures declined from 65 to 56 per cent between
fiscal years 1956 and 1961. Part of this trend is explained by the
high level of unemployment that developed during the period. The
relative decline in purchases was arrested in fiscal years 1962 and
1963, and the trend will be further moderated if the nation gets
back to high employment, but it is doubtful that it will be. reversed.
Long-Run Elasticity of the Federal Revenue System
Lewis has shown considerable ingenuity—as well as intimate knowl-
edge of many highly technical details—in his calculations of the
long-run elasticity of the federal revenue system. He estimates the
elasticities of the major taxes as follows: individual income tax,
1.25; corporate profits tax, 0.92; indirect business taxes, 0.85; and
contributions for social insurance, 1.0. He then proceeds to estimate
the yield of the present tax rates (plus the scheduled payroll tax
increases) in 1970, on the assumptions that (1) the income shares
will be the same as they were in 1960, (2) real GNP will grow at an
annual rate of 3.5 per cent from the 1960 base and (3) the GNP price
deflator will rise at an annual rate of 1.75 per cent. Given these
assumptions, it turns out that federal revenues would rise from
19 per cent of GNP in 1960 to 21 per cent in 1970 and that the GNP
elasticity of the revenue system would be about 1.2.
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The following comments and suggestions may be helpful in in-
terpreting and improving Lewis's results:
1. It is obvious that, with the individual income tax having an
elasticity of 1.25 and all other taxes having an elasticity no greater
than 1, the elasticity for the whole system could hardly be 1.2 unless
all the other taxes were of negligible importance. The two elasticities
turn out to be almost the same because Lewis has included the sched-
uled increases in OASDI contributions during the coming decade
in his estimate of the yield of the "present" revenue system for the
year 1970. Fortunately, he provides the data necessary to correct
for the increased contributions. For 1970, it turns out that the pay-
roll tax rates in effect in 1960 would produce contributions of $20.1
billion in 1970 instead of the $31.0 biffion shown in Lewis's Table 5.
2. Lewis's estimate that the elasticity of the federal corporate
income tax under conditions of stable growth may be as low as 0.92
is not borne out by his own data. This estimate is based on the decline
in the ratio of corporate tax on a national income basis to the tax
reported in Statistics of Income between 1948 and 1958. But he fails
to observe that, since 1950, changes in this ratio have been offset
by changes in the opposite direction in the ratio of profits as reported
in Statistics of Income to profits on the national income basis. This
explains why there seems to have been no trend during recent years
in the effective rate of corporate income tax on a national income
basis (see in Table 1). Actually, the small variation in effective
rates of the corporate income tax in 1952—58—years in which the
corporate income tax rate was the same—appears to be related to
changes in inventory profits.
In 1960, when inventory profits were negligible, the average
effective tax rate on corporate profits was exactly 47 per cent. By
contrast, using an elasticity of 0.92, Lewis obtains an average effec-
tive rate of 45 per cent in 1970. If this rate is adjusted upward by two
percentage points, the corporate profits tax would yield $1.7 billion
more in 1970 than the amount Lewis shows in Table 5.
3. I have some doubts about the use of a constant elasticity to
project individual income tax receipts for a period as long as ten
years. What seems to have remained constant in the past twelve
years is not the elasticity of the tax, but its built-in flexibility, or
dT/dY. Between 1955 and 1959, for example, the individual income
tax rose by $1.28 biffion for every $10 biffion rise in personal in-
come. Now, since dT/dY is larger than T/ Y, the latter will keep
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rising until it reaches dT/dY. This is what Lewis observes in his
Table 2. Note, however, that a dr/dY of 0.128 gives an elasticity of
1.6 when T/ Y is 8 per cent, 1.42 when TI Y is 9 per cent, and 1.28
when T/ Y is 10 per cent.
Lewis's assumption of an elasticity of 1.25 for the individual
income tax works out to be equivalent to a dT/dY of 0.143. I suspect
that a rise in the average marginal rate on personal income is in the
offing, but it is not clear when it will come and how steep the rise
will be. Pending further research into this problem, I would keep
dT/dY at about 0.13. This reduces the personal income tax shown
in Lewis's Table 5 for 1970 by $3.4 billion.
4. As Lewis suggests, much of the decline in the effective rate of
federal indirect business taxes between 1952 and 1960 was the result
of the relatively depressed level of automobile sales in the late
1950s. In fact, the average rate scarcely budged between 1957 and
1960, suggesting an elasticity closer to 1 rather than to 0.85. Never-
theless, in view of the heavy weight of the alcohol and tobacco
taxes in the excise tax structure, Lewis's present judgment of an
elasticity of less than 1 is perhaps justified. Additional quantitative
research needs to be done to clarify this point.
5. Collecting the suggested revisions of the yields of the payroll,
corporate, and individual income taxes explained above, I find that
the yield of the 1960 tax rates in 1970 would be close to $165 biffion,
as compared to the $177 biffion given in Table 5; and the ratio of
total receipts to GNP in 1970 turns out to be 19.6 per cent, instead
of 21.1 per cent. Thus, the GNP elasticity of the entire revenue sys-
tem for 1960—70 is reduced from Lewis's estimate of 1.25 to 1.07.
In other words, the federal revenue system at present tax rates is
only slightly better than proportional (assuming stable growth and
constant income shares).
6. It should also be noted that Lewis's projection of federal
receipts in 1970 starts off from the base year 1960, when unemploy-
ment averaged 5.6 per cent. Consequently, the 1970 projection
understates by a substantial margin what receipts would be at full
employment, which is now ordinarily assumed to be at the point
where unemployment is 4 per cent of the labor force. The shortfall
of GNP below full employment in 1960 was probably of the order
of about 5 per cent. Applying this to Lewis's GNP estimate for
1970 raises that figure by about $42 billion. At this level of employ-
ment, corporate profits would probably be a higher percentage of
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GNPthanin 1960, say, 10 per cent instead of 9 per cent. On these
assumptions, and adding the statutory increases in OASDI taxes
scheduled in the period 1960—70, federal receipts in 1970 at full em-
ployment would approach $190 billion, assuming an average annual
rate of growth in real GNP .of 3.5 per cent and an average increase
in the deflator of 1.75 per cent per year.
Cyclical Flexibility of the Federal Revenue System
Lewis shows that the fiscal effects of the "direct" federal stabilizers
(i.e., individual income and payroll taxes plus unemployment insur-
ance benefits) have increased sharply during the postwar period. At
the same time, changes in consumption have come to depend more
and more on changes in disposable income—a development that is
explained by the sharp reduction in the liquidity of consumers. As
a result of the rising sensitivity of consumption to income, the econ-
omy might now be highly unstable were it not for the stabilizers.
Although Lewis's multiplier is not the usual one we are accus-
tomed to seeing, I believe his conclusions are essentially correct.
What is perhaps equally interesting from a technical standpoint is
the manner in which these conclusions were obtained (see Table 10).
The heart of the exercise is the assumption that if there were no
direct stabilizers, the drop in disposable income would have been
reflected in consumption at the same rate as the actual drop in con-
sumption below the high-employment "norm." There is no way of
checking this assumption, but it is important to note that the ratio
of the shortfall in consumption to the shortfall in disposable income
increased so markedly over the four contractions in the postwar
period (from 0.28 to 1.00) that any other reasonable assumption
would not change the conclusion.
I have considerable doubts, however, about Lewis's finding that
the direct stabilizers have been materially strengthened in the postwar
period. It is true, as he points out, that payroll tax rates have in-
creased; and this, of course, increased the built-in flexibility of the
system somewhat. But individual income tax rates, though higher
than they were in 1949, are lower than during the Korean War.
Lewis was influenced by the fact that the direct stabilizers accounted
for 48 per cent of the change in GNP in the latest contraction; but
I believe that, if he were to correct for the degree of shortfall in each
of the recessions, much of the difference in the ratio of the direct
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stabilizers to GNP would disappear, except for the changes in tax
rates.
If these observations are correct, I would draw the following
conclusions from Lewis's data on the direct stabilizers: First, the
fiscal effects of the direct stabilizers have tended to increase over the
postwar period, but not significantly. Second, however, since changes
in consumption now appear to be more sensitive to changes in dis-
posable income than they were in the early postwar period, the im-
portance of the stabilizers has been greatly enhanced. Third, in
view of the possibility that the economy may well be more unstable
now than it was, say, fifteen years ago, it is time to devise practical
methods of strengthening the stabilizers and of using discretionary
fiscal actions more promptly and more vigorously during intervals
of economic contraction.
REPLY by Wilfred Lewis
1. Joseph A. Pechman has given us some useful additional facts
to be considered in making long-range estimates of federal revenues.
He is no doubt right that I have underestimated the elasticity of the
corporate profits tax and overestimated that of the individual income
tax. For the reason stated before, I am not yet convinced that the
elasticity of the profits tax is as high as unity on a national income
accounts basis. The 1958 average rate of 0.4720 is certainly an over-
statement (this was a recession year); and I would not take too
seriously the preliminary national income account estimates for
1960 (which give the 0.47. ratio used by Mr. Pechman) until these
can be reconciled with Statistics of Income data.
2. The major factor in Pechman's marking. down of the GNP
elasticity of the over-all system to 1.07 is his unwillingness to label
payroll tax rate increases scheduled under present law as part of the
revenue "system." While admittedly it stretches somewhat the. defi-
nition of elasticity to include rate changes, these are a fiscal fact of
life that should be kept in mind by policy-makers as well as private
forecasters. The tendency to overlook these rate changes just be-
cause they take place quietly and outside the administrative budget
has, among other things, given rise to misleading descriptions of
what went wrong with federal fiscal behavior in early 1960. Accepting
Pechman's suggested revisions for corporation and individual in-
come taxes, but not for payroll taxes, the elasticity of the federal
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revenue system still works out to be over 1.2. This is a rough measure
of the rate at which expenditures will have to grow in order to justify
the present revenue system, to say nothing of the matter of working
down the unemployment rate. The condition that expenditures will
roughly match available revenues can be as easily met at 3 per cent
growth as at 5 per cent in the absence of, a deliberate policy otherwise.
•3. The proposition of structural change toward a more unstable
economy, by virtue of a greater marginal response of consumption
to recession-induced changes in disposable personal income, can be
stated a little more rigorously than was done in my text. For a simple
linear consumption function, assuming no shift in the function, the
ratios used in Table 10(0.28 in 1949-Il, 0.71 in 1954-Il, 0.93 in 1958-I,
and 1.00 in 196 1.-I) can be shown to lie between the average and
marginal propensities to consume, since they are simply arbitrarily
weighted averages of the. two. Consequently, the ratios given over-
state the marginal propensities in 1949 and 1954,. have little bias in
1958, and understate in 1961, implying that the structural change is
even greater than indicated in Table 10. The argument that these
ratios are not indicative of net regressions of consumption on income
because we have not controlled for other variables falls down if we
make the not implausible assumption that the change in other van-
ables affecting consumption, such as liquid assets, takes place be-
tween recessions but can be regarded as constant for a particular
recession. I would conclude either that the consumption function is
nonlinear or that the structure has changed frequently enough to
make estimation of parameters by ordinary methods troublesome,
to say the least. The differences from one recession to the next
appear to be mainly in the area of consumer durables.
4. I agree with Mr. Hickman that the shortfall ratios do not meas-
ure the underlying marginal propensity and that, because of short-
term instability, the ratios should be interpreted cautiously. However,
I would point out that the shortfall estimates overstate consumption
propensities with respect to disposable income only on the conven-
tional assumption that the marginal propensity to consume during
recession is below the averagcan assumption which does not appear
consistent with the actual behavior of consumption during the two
most recent contractions. My basic contention—that there has been
an increased responsiveness of consumption to income changes
over the postwar periods—is also borne out by actual changes from
peak to trough as in Hickman's Table 2.
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Combining "conventional" measures of the disposable income—
the GNP relationship with the shortfall measures of consumption
propensities—Hickman notices no striking differences among the
multiplier values for different recessions (1.01, 1.17, 1.34, and 1.26).
However, using his method, and computing the multipliers as they
would appear without offsets from direct fiscal stabilizers, yields a
progression (1.03, 1.43, 1.69, and 1.91) which, while less striking
than the ratios in Table 10, still indicates to me an increasing im-
portance of the built-in fiscal stabilizers for the stability of the
economy, especially since, for reasons stated before, I think the
degree of change in underlying structural relationships is probably
understated in these calculations.
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